Analysis of Supervision Stability of New Energy Vehicle Subsidy Policy Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

Chen Hongzhuan, Qi Huijuan

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Journal of Industrial Technological Economics ›› 2019, Vol. 38 ›› Issue (2) : 114-119. DOI: 10.3969/j.issn.1004-910X.2019.02.014

Analysis of Supervision Stability of New Energy Vehicle Subsidy Policy Based on Evolutionary Game Theory

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{{article.zuoZheEn_L}}. {{article.title_en}}. {{journal.qiKanMingCheng_EN}}. 2019, 38(2): 114-119 https://doi.org/10.3969/j.issn.1004-910X.2019.02.014

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