在梳理效率工资理论相关理论文献基础上，本文研究效率工资理论中的监督成本问题。与现有效率工资理论不同的是，本文认为，失业并不是由雇主支付高于市场均衡工资所致，而是雇员的过度劳动引发的，在竞争劳动市场条件下，雇员劳动边际产出价值支付雇主的监督成本和雇员自身的劳动薪酬，作为回报，雇主给予雇员持续的、认可的工作条件和环境。在这交换中，雇员将出现超过一般强度的过度劳动。

On the basis of analyzing literature on the efficient wage theory,the paper stud ies the issue of supervising cost in efficient wage theory.Different from curre nt efficient wage theory,the paper argues that unemployment is not caused by emp loyersoverpayment than the market equilibrium wage,but by employees overwork ing.In a competitive labor market,the marginal product value of employees labo r pays for employers monitoring cost and employees wage.And as repay for thi s,employer provides employee with the consistent and agreed working condition
and environment.In exchange, employee tends to overwork.