以晋升博弈模型为基础，构建两个城市和一个大型企业共同参与的产业转移动态博弈模型，对城市间产业承接竞争问题进行研究。通过比较静态分析发现，转移企业时效性的增强将有助于降低地方政府与转移企业的谈判次数，而地方政府单纯提高让步幅度并不能降低谈判次数。当转移企业时效性较低而地方政府让步幅度较大时，谈判回合次数逐渐变大。在该情况下，产业转移租金完全耗散。研究表明产业转移租金完全耗散的直接原因是城市间竞争，但根本原因却是地方政府目标选择与城市发展利益不完全一致。

This paper researches the problems of competition about industry transfer between cities by building a dynamic game model which has two cities and a large enterprise.Through comparative static analysis,the article finds that increase of timeliness of transfer enterprises will reduce the rounds of government and enterprise bargaining while the governments simply improve the concession which will not reduce rounds of bargaining.When transferring enterprise timeliness is low and the government concessions range is larger,the rounds of bargaining approach infinity,which caused the rent dissipation.This study shows that competition among cities causes rent dissipation directly,but the root reason is that the government target selection and city development interests are not completely coincident.